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Blindsight patients can detect, localize, and discriminate visual stimuli in their blind field,
despite denying being able to see the stimuli. However, the literature documents the
cases of blindsight patients who demonstrated a preserved degree of awareness in their
impaired visual field. The aim of this study is to investigate the nature of visual processing
within the impaired visual field and to ask whether it reflects pure unconscious behavior
or conscious, yet degraded, vision. A hemianopic patient (SL) with a complete lesion to
the left primary visual cortex was tested. SL was asked to discriminate several stimulus
features (orientation, color, contrast, and motion) presented in her impaired visual field
in a two-alternative forced-choice task. SL had to report her subjective experience: in
the first experiment as “seen” or “guessed,” whereas in the second experiment as the
degree of clarity of her experience according to the perceptual awareness scale. In the
first experiment, SL demonstrated a performance above-chance in the discrimination
task for “guessed” trials, thus showing type 1 blindsight. In the second experiment,
however, SL showed above-chance performance only when she reported a certain
degree of awareness, thus showing that SL’s preserved discrimination ability relies on
conscious vision. These data show that graded measures to assess awareness, which
can better tap on the complexity of conscious experience, need to be used in order to
differentiate genuine forms of blindsight from degraded conscious vision.
Keywords: visual awareness, blindsight, primary visual cortex, perceptual awareness scale, degraded vision
INTRODUCTION
Patients with a destruction or disconnection of all or some parts of the striate cortex (area
V1) experience a region of blindness (a scotoma) in the corresponding portion of the visual
field (Holmes, 1945). However, some patients, when forced to do so, can detect, localize, and
discriminate stimuli briefly presented in their impaired visual field despite denying being able to
see the stimuli (Pöppel et al., 1973; Weiskrantz et al., 1974). For this phenomenon, the oxymoron
“blindsight” was coined (Weiskrantz et al., 1974) to highlight the dissociation between conscious
perception (absent) and performance (good). Indeed, the term “blind” refers to the patient’s self-
reports of not being able to see the stimulus in her/his blind field, while “sight” is demonstrated by
her/his above-chance performance in binary forced-choice tasks where the patient is requested to
“guess” a specific characteristic of the stimulus she/he denies seeing (Cowey, 2010).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 901
fpsyg-07-00901 June 14, 2016 Time: 13:46 # 2
Mazzi et al Different Measures to Assess Visual Awareness
Despite being considered by some researchers as an artifact
(e.g., Campion et al., 1983), blindsight remains, after 40 years
of investigation, one of the most striking example of visual
processing in the absence of visual awareness. This extensive
investigation, indeed, has revealed the large variety of features
(e.g., motion, orientation, and color), that can be successfully
processed by the brain and affect behavior in the absence of
visual awareness (for review, see Stoerig and Cowey, 1997;
Stoerig, 2006). Recently, the properties of stimuli that can be
unconsciously processed by blindsight patients have been found
to extend beyond simple features (Tamietto and Morrone, 2016),
such as including categorical perception (Trevethan et al., 2007;
Van den Stock et al., 2014), face identity or familiarity (Solcà
et al., 2015), facial or bodily expression (for a recent review, see
Celeghin et al., 2015a). Over the years, however, the definition of
blindsight has changed and two forms of it have been described
(Weiskrantz, 1998): type 1 blindsight is the classical type in
which the patient reports no awareness of any kind, and type 2
blindsight where the patient reports the feeling that something
has occurred in the blind field but denying any perceptual
awareness of it. That is, with type 2 blindsight, the patient is aware
that something has happened in her/his blind field but lacks
visual qualia, thus remaining unconscious to the phenomenical
contents of the visual stimulus.
Type 2 blindsight is clearly different from other forms of
awareness of stimuli in the blind field, such as the Riddoch
syndrome (Riddoch, 1917) where patients are conscious of having
seen movement in their blind field without being able to report
any other feature of the stimuli. In the Riddoch syndrome,
patients report having visual qualia whereas, by definition, in type
2 blindsight visual qualia are absent. A few authors (Zeki and
Ffytche, 1998; Stoerig and Barth, 2001), however, interpreted the
feelings reported by these patients not as non-visual in origin,
such as pertaining to the abstract knowledge of the occurrence
of the stimulus, but as weak, low-level visual experiences. If
this interpretation is correct, type 2 blindsight would be better
described as conscious but degraded vision instead of blindsight.
Indeed, the term blindsight would not be applicable as the patient
is not blind. A clear example of this debate can be found in studies
investigating the visual abilities of patient GY, one of the most
extensively studied blindsight patients. GY reports awareness of
fast motion and high-contrast visual targets in his blind visual
field. This self-report has been interpreted by some (Weiskrantz
et al., 1999) as evidence of non-visual knowledge of motion
whereas by others (Zeki and Ffytche, 1998; Stoerig and Barth,
2001) as evidence of weak visual experiences. It must, however,
be noted that GY’s descriptions of that “feeling” changed over
time (Macpherson, 2015), thus rendering it difficult to reach a
consensus, at least with respect to the nature of his feeling.
The controversy over the visual vs. non-visual nature of
awareness in the blind field of type 2 blindsight patients is,
in fact, not an easy one to solve, as only the patients’ verbal
reports can be taken into account. In this respect, it has been
suggested (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004) that the task used to
assess awareness in these patients might be too crude (“yes/no”
binary responses) to grasp subtle differences in phenomenal
contents. To obtain a finer measure of perceptual awareness, the
authors developed the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) by asking
healthy participants to spontaneously scale the clarity of their
perceptual experiences. They all consistently used a four-point
scale to make their perceptual judgments: (1) no experience of
the stimulus, (2) brief glimpse, (3) almost clear experience, and
(4) clear experience. Recent magnetoencephalography (Andersen
et al., 2015) and electroencephalography (Tagliabue et al., 2016)
studies have found that the PAS showed a strong correlation
between performance and awareness both on behavioral and
neural levels and can thus better reveal the complexity and
continuous nature of perceptual awareness than dichotomous
measures. Overgaard et al. (2008) tested a “blindsight” patient
with both a dichotomous measure (yes–no responses) and the
PAS. The authors asked patient GR to identify visual stimuli
(letters or geometrical figures) briefly presented in her blind
field (the upper-right quadrant) and they found divergent
results depending on the measure used. With the dichotomous
measure (“yes/no” response), the patient appeared to display
type 1 blindsight, i.e., accurate behavior in the absence of
acknowledged perceptual awareness. However, when GR was
asked to classify the clarity of her perception with the PAS,
she reported to have seen more stimuli than in the previous
task. Her criterion to acknowledge awareness changed and her
performance was accurate only for stimuli she reported to have
seen.
This evidence, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the
only one of its kind, is very important as it demonstrates that
a finer measure to assess perceptual awareness, i.e., the PAS,
can better substantiate the continuous nature of awareness as
far as visual qualia are concerned. Unfortunately, these results
cannot, in our opinion, be considered conclusive for various
reasons. First, the task at hand (discrimination of letters or
geometrical figures) is not the typically used with blindsight
patients. Second, and more importantly, the number of trials
administered to the patient was very low (33), the stimuli were
presented in different locations (11) and with different durations
(3), thus possibly rendering the probability to fall within a specific
level of perceptual scales (between the “seen” and “unseen”
categories or among the four levels of the PAS) unequal. It is
possible that “unseen” responses refer only to stimuli presented
for shorter durations at a less preserved visual field locations,
whereas the “seen” responses (whether in terms of the single
category in the dichotomous response or the three different
positive awareness categories in the PAS) only refer to stimuli
presented longer at a more preserved location. This paper, thus,
aims to further investigate perceptual awareness in the blind
visual field by extending the investigation by Overgaard et al.
(2008) while taking into account possible confounds induced
by the task and stimuli used. In this study, we used both
dichotomous and graded measures of awareness and asked
the patient to discriminate several stimulus features such as
orientation, color, contrast, and apparent and real motion, i.e.,
the classical features used with blindsight patients. Moreover, an
appropriate number of trials was administered to the patient,
and the stimuli were always presented at the same location and
with the same duration. Finally, to account for possible spurious
effects on the patient’s performance, we used a control condition,
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such as stimuli that cannot be discriminated even by sighted
participants.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Patient SL is a 45-years old right-handed woman who suffered
from a right homonymous hemianopia resulting from an
ischemic stroke with hemorrhagic evolution. MRI (Figure 1A)
and fMRI (see patient P5 in Celeghin et al., 2015b) documented a
complete destruction of the left primary visual cortex (V1). Visual
field defect (Figure 1B) was assessed by means of computerized
perimetry (Humphrey system). The patient was tested in 2014,
about 65 months after her neurological event. SL signed the
informed consent prior to participating in the study and was free
to withdraw at any time. The study was approved by the local
Ethics Committee and conducted in accordance with the 2013
Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Patient SL was tested in a dimly lit room while sitting in
a comfortable chair. An adjustable chin and forehead rest
minimized her head movements and ensured that distance
from the monitor remained constant at 57 cm. Visual stimuli
were presented using E-prime 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools)
via a 17-inch IBM G96 CRT monitor refreshing at 85 Hz
(resolution 1280 × 1024 pixels). On-line monitoring of SL’s
eye movements was performed by an infrared camera in order
to verify that she maintained fixation during the stimulus
presentation.
Different stimulus features (Figure 1D) were tested in
five different experimental sessions, administered over five
different days: orientation (vertical | horizontal Gabor patches.
Spatial frequency = 1.4 c/◦. Mean luminance = 4.89 cd/m2),
color (red | green Gaussian circles. Color coordinates: red:
x = 0.6150, y = 0.3526; green: x = 0.3135, y = 0.6052.
Luminance = 15.07 cd/m2), contrast (light | dark gray circles.
Luminance: light gray = 9.64 cd/m2; dark gray = 0.14 cd/m2.
Weber contrast = 0.97) and apparent and real motion direction
(upward | downward gratings and single bars. Speed of
motion: grating = 33.33◦/s; bar = 16.67 ◦/s. Mean luminance:
4.89 cd/m2). Each experimental session, in which only one
stimulus feature was tested, was composed of eight blocks
of 40 trials each (20 trials per stimulus type; e.g., for
orientation, 10 vertical and 10 horizontal Gabor patches), for
a total of 320 trials (e.g., for orientation, 160 vertical and
160 horizontal Gabor patches). With the exception of moving
gratings and bars which were directly generated using custom-
made e-Prime scripts, the other stimuli were generated using
Matlab R2009a (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA). Each
stimulus subtended 4◦ × 4◦ of the visual angle and was
presented for 72 ms. Stimuli were presented unilaterally in
the blind (right) visual field of patient SL, and were placed
7◦ above and 12◦ lateral to the central fixation point. The
location of the stimuli was tailored to SL’s visual field defect,
according to her latest Humphrey’s computerized perimetry
(Figure 1B). The background had a luminance of 4.89 cd/m2,
except for the color session in which the luminance was
15.07 cd/m2.
Experimental Procedure
Figure 1C illustrates the experimental procedure. Each trial
started with the appearance of a central fixation point (400 ms)
which lasted throughout the entire trial. Stimulus presentation
was preceded by a 1000 Hz warning acoustic tone lasting 150 ms.
The interval between the warning tone and stimulus onset was
randomized between 200 and 600 ms to avoid expectation. After
the stimulus disappeared, SL was asked to report the stimulus
feature in a two alternative forced-choice task (2AFC). When
discrimination was not possible, she was requested to guess. SL
was then asked to report with a binary response whether she
perceived the stimulus’ feature or had guessed. In order not
to bias her response criterion, patient SL was informed that a
stimulus was presented in each trial (i.e., no catch trials were
presented).
Statistical Analysis
For each of the stimulus features, trials were classified off-
line on the basis of “seen” and “guessed” responses, and the
percent accuracy for the feature discrimination was calculated.
Accuracy, in the “seen” class of responses, indicates SL’s ability
to discriminate the feature under the aware condition, while
accuracy in the “guessed” class of responses, indicates her ability
to discriminate the feature under the unaware condition. To
assess whether SL’s performance was significantly higher than
chance level (50%), we adopted the one-tailed binomial test. Two
binomial tests were performed, one for the “seen” responses and
one for the “unseen” responses.
Results
Accuracy: Seen–Guessed Task
Figures 1E,F show SL’s detection rate and accuracy in
discriminating stimulus features under the conscious (i.e., “seen”
reports) and unconscious (i.e., “guessed” reports) conditions.
Statistical analyses are reported separately for each stimulus
feature.
Orientation discrimination
Patient SL reported to have guessed the orientation (vertical |
horizontal) of the stimuli in almost all of the trials (98.75%)
and to have seen the stimulus orientation only in 1.25% of the
trials. Given the very low number of trials responded under
the aware condition (i.e., “seen” reports), these data were not
further analyzed. Under the unaware condition (i.e., “guessed”
reports), SL’s accuracy in orientation discrimination (56.91%) was
significantly higher than chance level (p < 0.01) demonstrating
implicit processing of stimulus orientation.
Color discrimination
Patient SL reported to have guessed the color (red | green) of
the stimuli in almost all of the trials (99.38%) and to have seen
the stimulus color only in 0.62% of the trials. Given the very
low number of trials responded under the aware condition (i.e.,
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Brain lesion reconstruction. (B) Visual field defect. (C) Experimental procedure. (D) Example of the stimuli used. (E) Experiment 1. Results of the YN
awareness task as a function of the stimulus features. (F) Experiment 1. Results of the 2AFC discrimination task as a function of the stimulus features.
(G) Experiment 2. Results of the PAS awareness task as a function of the stimulus features. The percentage of trials responded as PAS = 0 (black bars), PAS = 1
(dark gray bars) and PAS = 2 (light gray bars) is reported. (H) Experiment 2. Results of the 2AFC discrimination task as a function of the stimulus features. Accuracy
for trials responded as PAS = 0 (black bars), PAS = 1 (dark gray bars) and PAS = 2 (light gray bars) is reported.
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“seen” reports), these data were not further analyzed. Under the
unaware condition (i.e., “guessed” reports), SL’s accuracy in color
discrimination (60.36%) was significantly higher than chance
level (p < 0.001), demonstrating implicit processing of stimulus
color.
Contrast discrimination
Patient SL reported to have guessed the contrast (light | dark
gray) of the stimuli in 56.25% of the trials and to have seen the
stimulus contrast in the remaining 43.75% of the trials. Under
the unaware condition (i.e., “guessed” reports), SL’s accuracy in
contrast discrimination (61.04%) was significantly higher than
chance level (p < 0.005) demonstrating implicit processing of
stimulus contrast. Similarly, also under the aware condition (i.e.,
“seen” reports), SL’s accuracy (75.67%) was significantly higher
than chance level (p < 0.001), demonstrating explicit processing
of stimulus contrast.
Grating – (apparent) motion direction discrimination
Patient SL reported to have guessed the motion direction
(upward | downward) of gratings in almost all of the trials
(98.44%) and to have seen the motion direction only in
1.56% of the trials. Given the very low number of trials
responded under the aware condition (i.e., “seen” reports), these
data were not further analyzed. Under the unaware condition
(i.e., “guessed” reports), SL’s accuracy in motion direction
discrimination (53.31%) was not significantly higher than chance
level (p= 0.130), demonstrating no implicit processing of motion
direction of the gratings.
Bar – (real) motion direction discrimination
Patient SL reported to have guessed the motion direction
(upward | downward) of gratings in 90% of the trials and to
have seen the motion direction in the remaining 10% of the
trials. Under the unaware condition (i.e., “guessed” reports),
SL’s accuracy in motion direction discrimination (55.28%) was
significantly higher than chance level (p < 0.05), demonstrating
implicit processing of motion direction of the bars. Conversely,
under the aware condition (i.e., “seen” reports), SL’s accuracy
in motion direction discrimination (58%) was not significantly
higher than chance level (p= 0.189), demonstrating no ability to
discriminate motion direction of bars under the aware condition.
This lack of significance could, however, be related to a lack of
power in the statistical analysis as the number of trials (n = 32)
responded to be seen by SL is very small.
Discussion
In the present experiment, patient SL was presented with a
large variety of stimuli and asked to discriminate a stimulus
feature in a 2AFC task while reporting whether or not she
consciously perceived the stimulus using a binary measure. With
the exception of contrast, patient SL reported to have guessed
every feature in almost all the trials. Under this “guessing”
condition, SL was nonetheless able to reach an accuracy level
higher than chance for the discrimination of orientation, color,
contrast, and (real) motion features of the stimuli. By using a
binary measure to assess awareness, patient SL can, thus, be
classified as a type 1 blindsight patient: visual processing in the
absence of perceptual awareness.
In the next experiment, we tested SL’s visual abilities again
within her blind visual field but changed how she reported
awareness. Instead of a binary measure, we used a graded
measure, the PAS (Overgaard et al., 2008).
EXPERIMENT 2
Materials and Methods
Participants
Patient SL was tested also in this experiment. In addition, we
collected a sample of 10 healthy volunteers (aged 22–29 years) as
a control group. They were all right-handed and all had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity with no history of neurological
and psychiatry disorders.
All participants signed the informed consent prior to
participating in the study and they were free to withdraw at any
time. The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee and
conducted in accordance with the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 with a
few additions. In addition to stimulus feature used in Experiment
1 (high discriminability stimuli), we added another condition
(low discriminability stimuli) for each of the five features
tested: orientation (vertical | horizontal Gabor patches. Spatial
frequency = 14 c/◦. Luminance = 4.89 cd/m2), color (red | green
Gaussian circles. Color coordinates: red: x = 0.4050, y = 0.3849;
green: x= 0.3826, y= 0.4171. Luminance= 0.27 cd/m2), contrast
(light | dark gray circles. Luminance: light gray = 5.02 cd/m2;
dark gray = 4.75 cd/m2. Weber contrast = 0.03) and direction
of apparent and real motion (upward | downward gratings and
single bars. Speed of motion: grating= 66.66 ◦/s; bar= 33.33 ◦/s.
Mean luminance: 4.89 cd/m2). The parameters of the low
discriminability stimuli were selected on the basis of the results
obtained in the group of healthy participants showing that
their performance was at chance level. This additional condition
served as a control condition in which chance-level performance
was expected in patient SL. Moreover, to have the possibility
to calculate criterion and sensitivity measures, catch trials were
added. As in Experiment 1, patient SL was informed of the
stimulus types. More specifically, in Experiment 2, she was told
that in 20% of the trials the stimulus would not be presented. For
both actual stimulus and catch trials, if feature discrimination was
not possible, SL was asked to guess the feature of the stimulus.
Both the blind and the intact visual fields were tested in SL while
only the right visual field was tested in the group of healthy
volunteers. For SL’s blind visual field, each experimental session,
in which only one feature was tested, was composed of eight
blocks of 100 trials each (20 trials per stimulus type and degree of
discriminability plus 20 catch trials), for a total of 800 trials (e.g.,
for orientation 160 vertical and 160 horizontal Gabor patches
at high discriminability, 160 vertical and 160 horizontal Gabor
patches at low discriminability plus 160 catch trials). For SL’s
intact visual field and the right visual field of healthy participants,
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we administered four blocks of 50 trials (10 trials per stimulus
type and degree of discriminability plus 10 catch trials) for a total
of 200 trials.
Experimental Procedure
The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 1
(Figure 1C) with the exception of how SL was to report awareness
of the stimulus. In this experiment, instead of using a binary
(seen | guess) forced-choice response, SL was asked to rate
the clarity of her visual experience in her blind visual field
according to the PAS developed by Ramsøy and Overgaard
(2004). The PAS is composed of a four-level rating of the
clearness of the visual experience: 0 = no visual experience;
1 = brief glimpse; 2 = almost clear visual experience; and
3 = clear visual experience. The actual meaning of each level
was fully explained and discussed with the patient. To be
certain that no misunderstanding could occur, we conducted
a training session prior to the real experiment, frequently
interrupting the patient to thoroughly discuss about her actual
rating of the visual experience (Sandberg et al., 2013). Specifically,
we stressed the distinction between level of confidence (as
usually measured by confidence rating scales) and clearness
of the visual experience as measured by the PAS (Sandberg
et al., 2013). At the end of the training session, SL reported
to have used PAS levels higher than zero (i.e., 1, 2, and
3) in occurrence with visual experiences of the stimuli and
to scale these levels according with the clarity of her visual
experiences.
As we expected that healthy controls would be able to detect
the presence of the stimuli, they were not asked to rate the clarity
of their visual experience but only to perform the 2AFC task with
respect to the specific feature they were requested to discriminate.
Statistical Analysis
To assess whether the performance of healthy participants and
patient SL in her intact visual field was significantly higher
than chance level (50%) in detecting a specific stimulus feature
we adopted the one-tailed binomial test. A total of 20 of one-
tailed binomial tests (five feature discriminations by two levels
of discriminability for the control group and patient SL) were
performed. Moreover, to detect possible response biases toward
a specific level of a feature, we analyzed the binomial distribution
of the responses given with catch trials.
Given that with catch trials no a priori hypothesis on the
direction of the difference can be made, we adopted the two-
tailed binomial test to assess the presence of a response bias.
The same analysis was performed on the data obtained with
SL for stimuli presented in her blind field. The only difference
is that for each stimulus feature, trials were classified off-line
on the basis of the PAS responses, and the percent accuracy of
feature discrimination was calculated for each of the four levels
of the scale. The data were then entered in one-tailed or two-
tailed binomial tests depending on the presence/absence of the
visual stimulus as described above. Moreover, signal detection
theory (SDT; Green and Swets, 1966) measures d′ and c were
used to assess sensitivity and response criterion, respectively,
for each stimulus feature. Hit rate was defined as the trials in
which the stimulus was presented and the PAS response was
not zero (i.e., PAS = 1, 2, and 3). False alarms were defined as
the trials in which the stimulus was not presented (catch trials)
and the PAS response was not zero. Statistical significance was
measured by means of receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves. As a measure of goodness-of-fit, sensitivity (true positive),
and specificity (true negative) were computed, and a ROC
curve was generated. We calculated sensitivity and specificity
pairs and plot sensitivity on the y-axis by (1-specificity) on the
x-axis in order to create the ROC curve. The non-parametric
(distribution-free) method to calculate the area under the curve
(AUC) was used. AUC values range from 0.5 and 1.0 with
larger values indicative of better fit. See Azzopardi and Cowey
(1997) and Van den Stock et al. (2014) for more details on the
procedure.
Results
Healthy Participants: Accuracy
Healthy participants performed significantly (p < 0.001) above
chance with high discriminability stimuli in discriminating
orientation (98.63%), color (97.75%), contrast (99%), apparent
(99.13%), and real (99.88%) motion. With low discriminability
stimuli, they instead have an accuracy at chance level (lowest
p > 0.1) for orientation (51.38%), color (51.75%), and
apparent motion (56.88%) while they could discriminate contrast
(76.25%) and real motion (63.13%) with an accuracy higher
than chance (p < 0.05). In the same vein, they do not
show any response bias with catch trials for orientation
(49.50%), color (51.25%), and apparent motion (50.25%)
while they showed a tendency for a response bias for
contrast (57.25%, p = 0.113) and real motion (58.75%,
p= 0.089).
Taken together, these results show that healthy participants
performed above chance with high discriminability stimuli and at
chance level with low discriminability stimuli (with the exception
of contrast and real motion discrimination, for which, however, a
possible confound of the presence of a response bias needs to be
taken into account).
SL’s Intact Visual Field: Accuracy
Patient SL performed significantly (p < 0.001) above chance
with high discriminability stimuli presented in her intact visual
field in discriminating orientation (100%), color (100%), contrast
(100%), apparent (97.50%), and real (100%) motion. With
low discriminability stimuli SL showed an accuracy at chance
level (lowest p > 0.6) for orientation (50%), color (52.50%),
and apparent (52.50%) and real (53.75%) motion while she
could discriminate contrast (87.50%) with an accuracy higher
than chance (p < 0.001). As for catch trials, she did not
show any response bias (lowest p > 0.3) for orientation
(45%), color (50%), and apparent (57.50%) and real (52.50%)
motion while she had a response bias (p < 0.001) for contrast
discrimination (32.50%). As for healthy participants, these data
show that in her intact visual field SL performed above chance
with high discriminability stimuli and at chance level with
low discriminability stimuli (with the exception of contrast
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discrimination, for which, however, the presence of a response
bias need to be considered).
SL’s Blind Visual Field: Accuracy as a Function of the
PAS
Figures 1G,H show SL’s rate of detection and accuracy in
discriminating stimulus features as a function of her reports
on the PAS. Statistical analysis is reported separately for each
stimulus feature.
Orientation discrimination
In her blind field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0)
of the orientation (vertical | horizontal) for high discriminability
stimuli in 39.50% of the trials and to have seen a brief glimpse
(PAS = 1) of the stimulus in the remaining 60.50% of the
trials. She never responded 2 or 3 on the PAS, indicating
lack of any clear visual experience of the stimulus. Under
the unaware condition (i.e., “no visual experience” reports;
PAS= 0) SL’s accuracy (55.11%) was not significantly higher than
chance level (p = 0.212), demonstrating no implicit processing
of stimulus orientation. Similarly, SL’s accuracy in orientation
discrimination (53.32%) was not significantly higher than chance
level (p = 0.333) when she reported to have perceived a brief
glimpse of the stimulus (PAS = 1), demonstrating that this level
of awareness of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate
stimulus orientation.
With stimuli at low discriminability presented in her blind
visual field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of
the orientation (vertical | horizontal) of the stimuli in 24.14%
of the trials and to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of
the stimulus in the remaining 75.86% of the trials. She never
responded 2 or 3 on the PAS, indicating no clear/almost clear
visual experience of the stimulus. Under the unaware condition
(i.e., “no visual experience” reports; PAS = 0), SL’s accuracy
in orientation discrimination (51.68%) was not significantly
higher than chance level (p = 0.123) demonstrating no implicit
processing of stimulus orientation. In the same vein, SL’s
accuracy (49.75%) was not significantly higher than chance level
(p = 0.475) when she reported to have perceived a brief glimpse
of the stimulus (PAS = 1) demonstrating again that this level
of awareness of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate
stimulus orientation.
Color discrimination
Patient SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of the color
(red | green) of highly discriminable stimuli in 41.56% of the trials
and to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of the stimulus in the
remaining 58.44% of the trials. She never responded with 2 or
3 on the PAS indicating that she did not have an almost clear
or clear visual experience of the stimulus. Under the unaware
condition (i.e., “no visual experience” reports; PAS = 0) SL’s
accuracy in color discrimination (50.16%) was not significantly
higher than chance level (p = 0.177) demonstrating no implicit
processing of stimulus color. Similarly, SL’s accuracy (51.16%)
was not significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.112)
when she reported to have perceived a brief glimpse of the
stimulus (PAS = 1) demonstrating that this level of awareness
of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate stimulus
color.
For stimuli of low discriminability presented in her blind
visual field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of
the color (red | green) of the stimuli in the 8.13% of trials
and to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of the stimulus
in the remaining 91.87% of trials (she never responded 2 or
3 at the PAS, indicating lack of any clear visual experience
of the stimulus). Under the unaware condition (i.e., “no
visual experience” reports; PAS = 0), SL’s accuracy in color
discrimination (54.50%) was not significantly higher than
chance level (p = 0.232) demonstrating no implicit processing
of stimulus color. Similarly, SL’s accuracy (47.22%) was not
significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.475) when she
reported to have perceived a brief glimpse of the stimulus
(PAS = 1) demonstrating again that this level of awareness
of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate stimulus
color.
Contrast discrimination
Patient SL reported no visual experience (PAS= 0) of the contrast
(light | dark gray) of highly discriminable stimuli only in 0.94% of
the trials (due to the low percentage, accuracy was not analyzed
at this level of the PAS), to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1)
of the stimulus in 45.31% of the trials and to have perceived
the stimulus almost clearly (PAS = 2) in the remaining 53.75%
of the trials (she never responded 3 on the PAS, indicating no
clear visual experience of the stimulus). SL’s accuracy in contrast
discrimination was significantly higher than chance both when
she reported a brief glimpse (PAS = 1: 65.51%, p < 0.001) and
when she perceived the stimulus almost clearly (PAS= 2: 76.79%,
p < 0.001), demonstrating that these levels of awareness of the
stimulus enabled SL to discriminate stimulus contrast.
With stimuli at low discriminability presented in her blind
visual field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of
the contrast (light | dark gray) of the stimuli in 78.75% of
the trials and to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of
the stimulus in the remaining 21.25% of the trials (she never
responded 2 or 3 on the PAS, indicating lack of any clear visual
experience of the stimulus). Under the unaware condition (i.e.,
“no visual experience” reports; PAS= 0), SL’s accuracy in contrast
discrimination (50.05%) was not significantly higher than chance
level (p = 0.475) demonstrating no implicit processing of
stimulus contrast. Similarly, SL’s accuracy (56.86%) was not
significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.358) when she
reported to have perceived a brief glimpse of the stimulus
(PAS = 1), demonstrating again that this level of clearness of the
stimulus was not enough to discriminate stimulus contrast.
Grating – (apparent) motion direction discrimination
Patient SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of the
motion direction (upward | downward) for high discriminability
stimuli in the 59.56% of trials, to have seen a brief glimpse
(PAS = 1) of the stimulus in 39.50% of the trials and to have
seen the stimulus almost clearly (PAS = 2) only in 0.94%
of the trials (due to the low percentage, accuracy was not
analyzed at this level of the PAS). She never responded 3 on
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the PAS indicating that she never had a clear visual experience
of the stimulus. Under the unaware condition (i.e., “no visual
experience” reports; PAS = 0) SL’s accuracy in motion direction
discrimination (52.80%) was not significantly higher than chance
level (p = 0.306), demonstrating no implicit processing of
stimulus motion direction. Similarly, SL’s accuracy (48.44%)
was not significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.500)
when she reported to have perceived a brief glimpse of the
stimulus (PAS = 1) demonstrating that this level of awareness
of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate stimulus motion
direction.
With stimuli at low discriminability presented in her blind
visual field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of
the discrimination of motion (upward | downward) of the
stimuli in 67.50% of the trials, to have seen a brief glimpse
(PAS = 1) of the stimulus in 23.19% of the trials and to
have seen the stimulus almost clearly (PAS = 2) only in
0.31% of the trials (due to the low percentage, accuracy was
not analyzed at this level of the PAS). She never responded
3 on the PAS, indicating that she never had a clear visual
experience of the stimulus. Under the unaware condition (i.e.,
“no visual experience” reports; PAS = 0) SL’s accuracy in
motion direction discrimination (54.11%) was not significantly
higher than chance level (p = 0.188), demonstrating no implicit
processing of stimulus motion direction. In the same vein, SL’s
accuracy (57.38%) was not significantly higher than chance level
(p = 0.500) when she reported to have perceived a brief glimpse
of the stimulus (PAS = 1) demonstrating again that this level
of awareness of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate
stimulus motion direction.
Bar – (real) motion direction discrimination
Patient SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of
the direction of motion (upward | downward) for high
discriminability stimuli in 33.33% of the trials and to have seen
a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of the stimulus in the remaining
66.67% of the trials (she never responded 2 or 3 on the PAS,
indicating that she never had any clear visual experience of
the stimulus). Under the unaware condition (i.e., “no visual
experience” reports; PAS = 0) SL’s accuracy in motion direction
discrimination (47.40%) was not significantly different from
chance level (p = 0.500) demonstrating no implicit processing
of stimulus motion direction. Similarly, SL’s accuracy in motion
direction discrimination (50.64%) was not significantly higher
than chance level (p= 0.419) when she reported to have perceived
a brief glimpse of the stimulus (PAS= 1) demonstrating that this
level of awareness of the stimulus was not enough to discriminate
stimulus motion direction.
With stimuli at low discriminability presented in her blind
visual field, SL reported no visual experience (PAS = 0) of the
direction of motion (upward | downward) of the stimuli in
59.56% of the trials, to have seen a brief glimpse (PAS = 1) of
the stimulus in the remaining 40.44% of the trials (she never
responded 2 or 3 on the PAS), indicating that she never had
any clear visual experience of the stimulus. Under the unaware
condition (i.e., “no visual experience” reports; PAS = 0) SL’s
accuracy in motion direction discrimination (52.23%) was not
significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.213) demonstrating
no implicit processing of stimulus motion direction. Similarly,
SL’s accuracy in motion direction discrimination (49.16%) was
not significantly higher than chance level (p = 0.363) when
she reported to have perceived a brief glimpse of the stimulus
(PAS = 1), demonstrating again that this level of awareness of
the stimulus was not enough to discriminate stimulus motion
direction.
Catch trials
With catch trials, SL reported to have no experience (PAS = 0)
of the stimulus being presented in almost all the catch trials
(orientation: 98.75% trials; color: 94.38%; contrast: 70%; apparent
direction of motion: 80.63%; real direction of motion: 96.88%),
thus demonstrating the ability to discriminate between the
presence and the absence of the stimulus for all the features to
discriminate. Moreover, she did not show any response bias in
any of the different features tested (orientation: p = 0.385; color:
p = 0.412; contrast: p = 0.333; apparent direction of motion:
p= 0.813; real direction of motion: p= 0.813).
SL’s Blind Visual Field: Signal Detection Theory
Analysis as a Function of the PAS
Given that SL’s performance was above chance only with high
discriminability stimuli (and only these stimuli were used in
Experiment 1), sensitivity and criterion were calculated only for
these features. Results showed that sensitivity was high for all
the stimulus features to be discriminated: orientation (PAS = 1:
d′ = 2.508), color (PAS = 1: d′ = 1.800), contrast (PAS = 1:
d′ = 2.753; PAS= 2: d′ = 4.251), apparent (PAS= 1: d′ = 0.626),
and real (PAS= 1: d′ = 1.314) motion. Moreover, the area under
the ROC curve was significant (p < 0.001) for all the conditions:
orientation (PAS = 1: 0.773), color (PAS = 1: 0.743), contrast
(PAS= 1: 0.884; PAS= 2: 0.982), apparent (PAS= 1: 0.606), and
real (PAS = 1: 0.712) motion. Importantly, however, for almost
all the features SL showed a response bias toward reporting to
have seen the stimulus (orientation: c = 0.988; color: c = 0.687;
apparent motion: c = 0.570; real motion: c = 0.226), even just
as a brief glimpse, thus possibly lowering the reliability of the
level of accuracy found for those stimuli (Azzopardi and Cowey,
1998). Conversely, SL showed an opposite response bias for
contrast discrimination, (i.e., the tendency to report not having
seen the stimulus) when she reported a brief glimpse (PAS = 1:
c=−0.672) and no bias when she reported an almost clear visual
experience (PAS= 2: c= 0.009).
Discussion
In the present experiment, patient SL was presented with the
same variety of stimuli as in Experiment 1 and asked to
discriminate a stimulus feature while reporting whether or not
she consciously perceived the stimulus using the PAS. Patient
SL reported to have guessed the features of stimuli of high
discriminability in about one-third of the trials. In contrast to
the results of the previous experiment, when “guessing,” SL
did not perform better than chance in any of the stimulus
features. In contrast, she performed above chance only for
contrast discrimination and when reported to have been aware,
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thus indicating a positive relationship between accuracy and
the clarity of visual qualia. Interestingly, SL could discriminate
the presence/absence of the stimulus for all the features tested,
as she almost never reported seeing the stimulus when catch
trials were presented. Moreover, the only condition in which SL
demonstrated a high sensitivity with no bias in reporting having
seen the stimulus was that of contrast discrimination, which is
the condition in which SL performed above-chance level under
the “aware” condition. Taken together, these data demonstrate
that when using the PAS to assess awareness, patient SL cannot
be classified as a type 1 blindsight patient but as a patient with
conscious vision.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we assessed the visual abilities within the blind
field of one hemianopic patient. In two different experiments, we
asked the patient to discriminate several features of visual stimuli
briefly presented in her impaired visual field and to report visual
awareness by means of binary (yes–no response, Experiment 1) or
graded (four-level PAS, Experiment 2) measures. In Experiment
1, patient SL demonstrated type 1 blindsight (above-chance
accuracy without acknowledged awareness) for orientation, color,
contrast, and real motion discrimination. However, when asked
to rate her perceptual experience with the PAS, her blindsight
disappeared. In Experiment 2, indeed, she performed with
above-chance accuracy for contrast discrimination only when
she reported to have seen the stimuli, thus showing conscious,
although degraded, vision, instead of pure blindsight. Taken
together, the results of the two experiments show that patient SL’s
performance cannot be interpreted as type 1 or type 2 blindsight
as she experienced visual qualia in her “blind” field. Instead,
SL’s visual abilities within her “blind” visual field can be better
ascribed to a conscious experience though of a very different
nature to that of normal vision.
Interestingly, in accordance with the findings by Overgaard
et al. (2008), SL’s threshold to acknowledge conscious vision
changed depending on the way awareness was assessed. When
asked to assess her awareness of the stimuli by using a binary
measure, she reported a mean percentage of acknowledged
awareness in only 11.44% of the trials while when using the
PAS, she reported (most of the times as a brief glimpse)
to have seen the same stimuli in 65.02% of the trials. This
evidence raises the possibility, already put forward elsewhere
(Overgaard, 2011), that when asked to report whether they
see a stimulus with a binary yes/no response, patients might
be reluctant to acknowledge awareness for the kind of visual
experience they have in their impaired visual field, thus setting
their threshold too high and, as a consequence, increasing
the number of false negatives of awareness by reporting
conscious experience as unconscious. However, when patients
are given a fine scale to categorize their visual experience
of phenomenological properties, they tend to assess what
they previously would have classified as “unseen” instead
as having had the experience of brief glimpse if not as
an almost clear visual experience. This possibility is in
accord with several findings present in literature showing that
visual processing within the impaired visual field is different
from normal vision (Azzopardi and Cowey, 1998; Stoerig
and Barth, 2001; Cowey, 2010). If conscious experience is
characterized by different levels of clarity, a finer scale able
to better characterize subtly different perceptual experiences
is preferable as it might be more suitable to disentangle
genuine forms of blindsight from degraded but conscious
vision.
A final important point deserving some considerations relates
to the possibility for patients with a complete lesion to V1
to experience conscious visual qualia. The clearest example of
conscious vision in absence of V1 is illustrated by the Riddoch
syndrome (Riddoch, 1917) in which patients are conscious of
motion in their “blind” visual field despite denying having seen
any other feature of the stimulus. The presence of visual qualia in
patients with a lesion to V1 has two main important implications.
First, the area of the visual field represented by the lesioned
portion of V1 cannot be considered as totally blind (Cowey,
2010), as conscious experience is still possible, though of a
different nature of normal vision. Second, the fact that a complete
lesion to V1 does not completely abolish conscious vision, at
least the crude type of consciousness sufficient to report simple
visual qualia (Zeki and Ffytche, 1998), implies that V1 is not
necessary for conscious vision (Ffytche and Zeki, 2011). To be
tenable, however, V1 lesion needs to be complete (Fendrich
et al., 1992). In this paper, we studied a patient whose lesion
was well documented to be complete. Indeed, fMRI evidence
(Celeghin et al., 2015b) showed no BOLD activity in her left V1
during visual presentation. Moreover, direct TMS to her left V1
(Mazzi et al., 2014; Bagattini et al., 2015), at an intensity well
above threshold, did not result in any visual percepts. Although
the activity in SL’s V1 was totally abolished, she experienced
a certain level of awareness of the stimulus features she was
presented with. The exact areas that might subserve conscious
visual processing in absence of V1 is still unknown. It has
been proposed that either subcortical pathways bypassing V1
(Schoenfeld et al., 2002), or prestriate cortex (Zeki and Ffytche,
1998) or areas along the dorsal stream (Goodale and Milner,
1992), more specifically the intraparietal sulcus (Mazzi et al.,
2014; Silvanto, 2014; Bagattini et al., 2015), could be the neural
correlates of these conscious percepts. These accounts are not
mutually exclusive and a thoughtful discussion on this topic goes
beyond the scope of this paper. What is important to stress
here is that the present paper reports additional evidence of a
patient with a complete lesion to V1 who, nonetheless, retains
some kind of awareness of the stimuli presented to her impaired
visual field, thus implying that V1 is not necessary for visual
awareness, despite its importance for normal vision (Silvanto,
2015).
CONCLUSION
The present data show that a finer scale to assess perceptual
experience can more accurately identify conscious vision in
hemianopic patients who would have been otherwise diagnosed
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erroneously as having type 1 blindsight with a dichotomous
measure. Consequently, graded measures to assess awareness
in hemianopic patients need to be used to better
differentiate genuine forms of blindsight from degraded
conscious vision, as they are clearly different phenomena
(Azzopardi and Cowey, 1997; Marzi et al., 2004; Weiskrantz,
2009).
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